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IT'S TIME TO CALL 911 FOR GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY
In our modem society we are trained, almost from birth, that
we should telephone 9111 to summon help m the event of a med-
ical emergency 2 Generally, when one calls 911, prompt help ar-
rives quickly, and professional assistance is rendered, resulting in
countless saved lives? Unfortunately, the 911 system occasionally
fails with disastrous and fatal consequences for the person relying
on the service. In these instances, the injured parties or their repre-
sentatives often institute personal injury or wrongful death suits
against the governmental entity responsible for the operation of the
911 system. In most of these cases, the governmental entity argues
some form of governmental or sovereign immunity as a defense.4
Courts often accept this defense, leaving a surviving individual or
family to bear tremendous financial burdens and emotional pain,
without any form of compensation.
This note addresses the use of governmental immunity as
1. For the purposes of this note, 911 will refer to the three-digit telephone number
systems in place in most populated regions of the United States in which emergency
assistance is available simply by dialing the three-digit number.
2. It is estimated that 99% of adult Americans living in an area serviced by a 911
system know to dial 911 in the event of an emergency; even children as young as three
years old can be trained to dial 911. David Foster, 'Help Officer, My Souffle is Fall-
ing Non-Emergencies Clog 911 Lines, L.A. TIVES, Mar. 15, 1992, at Al. The 911
system is so well known that there is even a television show, Rescue 911 (CBS television
series, weekly broadcasts) documenting and re-creating its exploits. Id.
3. The number of 911 calls nationwide is estimated to be in the tens of millions. In
1991, New York City alone received 8.3 million calls, which is an increase from 6.5
million calls per year in the early 1970's; the record number of calls was 42,787 on July
4, 1991, in New York City. Donatella Lorch, New York Streamlines an Essential Link:
911, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, § 1, at 39.
4. In this note, the terms governmental immunity and sovereign immunity will be
used interchangeably. Originally, sovereign immunity was only applicable to the head of
state, while governmental ummunity applied to acts of the state. See CHESTER J. ANTIEAU
& MILO MECHAM, TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 7 (1990).
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applied to negligent operations of 911 emergency medical services.
Part I of this note reviews 911 services and their anticipated uses,
and describes some of the areas in which a system failure can
occur due to negligence. This section also discusses sovereign
immunity, its applicability to negligent 911 situations, and the
various constitutional issues involved, such as the duty to protect
or to rescue. Part II surveys case law involving negligent conduct
on the part of government emergency medical systems and analyz-
es why the use of governmental immunity is flawed. Section III
proposes standards of liability for negligent 911 systems. This note
argues that governmental immunity, as a defense to negligent oper-
ations of 911 emergency medical services, is out-moded given our
society's expansive concepts of tort liability
I. OVERVIEW
A. 911 Services Generally
The first 911-type emergency number system was implemented
in Great Britain m 1937, 5 but such systems did not come into use
in the United States until the 1960's.6 In the United States, con-
gressional and executive initiative served as the impetus for sys-
tems that focused on increasing and promoting public safety 7 To-
day, 911 systems are in use across the United States, serving 75%
of the population and covering 25% of the nation's land surface.8
The primary reason for implementing 911 was the anticipated re-
duction in the time it would take for an individual to call an am-
bulance, request emergency medical assistance, and receive help.9
5. Bertram A. Maas, Comment, "911" Emergency Assistance Call Systems: Should
Local Governments be Liable for Negligent Failure to Respond?, 8 GEO. MASON U. L.
REV. 103, 103 n.1 (1985) (discussing history of 911 systems).
6. The 911 systems were pioneered by AT&T. The first 911 system in the United
States came into operation in Haleyville, Alabama, in the late 1960's. Foster, supra note
2, at Al.
7. See JAMES E. GEORGE, LAW AND EMERGENCY CARE 51-52 (1980). Part of the
mandate for the increased training and use of ambulances and the emergency medical
technicians (EMTs) was the passage of federal and state highway safety acts. Id. at 51.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement led to the national implementation of
911 type systems. Maas, supra note 5, at 103 n.i.
8. Foster, supra note 2, at Al.
9. If a caller is too injured, or is otherwise unable to identify himself or herself, it is
time-consuming to determine the identity of the caller on the old seven-digit emergency
lines or on 911 systems that cannot display via computers the telephone number and
address of the caller's telephone. Mike Comerford, Enhanced 911 System to Start Six
Months Late, CI. TRiu., Mar. 7, 1990, at 1 (may take fifteen minutes to identify callers);
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Public response to the 911 systems was positive since it eliminated
reliance on private mortuary-ambulance services."°
All emergency calls to a 911 system are routed through a
central receiving center, where a dispatcher receives the call, dis-
cusses the emergency with the caller, and decides the appropriate
response action.-' At this point in the system, many errors result-
mg in injury or death are made.' A dispatcher may decide that
the call is not an emergency, when in fact, the caller is in a life-
threatening situation; 3 or the dispatcher may give medical advice
over the telephone, when in fact he or she has no professional
medical training. 4  In other cases, a dispatcher may fail to
see also Reed Abelson, Rescuing 911, FORBES, Mar. 2, 1992, at 103 (may take up to 45
nunutes to identify callers in Boulder, Colorado without unproved 911 systems). With
unproved 911 systems, called "enhanced 911," or "E911," identification of the caller's
telephone number and address takes place in less than one minute. Albert J. Panst, Towns
Wary of Joining '911' Emergency System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, § 12NJ (N.J.
Weekly), at 1 (only 15 seconds to identify caller with E911); Lorch, supra note 3, at 39
(only 30 seconds for system to identify caller).
10. See GEORGE, supra note 7, at 51. In many communities, the private company that
operated ambulances also operated mortuary hearses, often in the same vehicle. TIs fact
created an inherent conflict of interest, since the company was paid for its services wheth-
er the injured passenger survived or died. See id.
11. See, e.g., Maas, supra note 5, at 104 (describing the process of call receipt, evalu-
ation, and response).
12. See cases discussed infra Part U.
13. See, e.g., Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 128-29 (D.C. 1990) (man
with no history of headaches who called to complain of severe headache was told by the
dispatcher to take aspirin; two days later, the man died from a stroke); St. George v. City
of Deerfield Beach, 568 So. 2d 931, 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (city admitted that a
dispatcher who did not dispatch paramedics mishandled calls from a woman who said that
her ex-husband was bleeding seriously, and who later died from gastrointestinal hemor-
rhaging); Plea Bargain Arranged in '911' Killing, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 23, 1992, at A18
(boy being beaten to death in Fresno, Califormia called 911 and requested help; dispatcher
failed to send assistance, despite the fact that sounds of a fight were clearly audible to
the dispatcher).
14. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 627 F. Supp. 766, 767-68 (E.D. Wis. 1986),
aff'd, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) (dis-
patcher with no medical training diagnosed breathing problems described by a woman in
two telephone calls covering an eight hour period, and told her to breathe into a paper
bag; the woman died from respiratory failure). It is estimated that over 75% of all 911
dispatchers have no formal medical traimng. John D. Cramer, Training Program for Emer-
gency Ditpatchers Helps Make 911 a Lifeline; Response: Workers Who Are Trained to
Give Medical Instructions Are Helping Make the Most of the Crucial Minutes Between a
Call for Help and its Arrival, L.A. TnIMS, Oct. 31, 1990, at B3. This situation has creat-
ed some paradoxical results. Fear of liability has led some 911 systems to forbid the dis-
pensing of medical advice over the telephone. Pansi, supra note 9, at 1. In Califoria, a
small child fell into a five-gallon bucket of water and started to drown, and when the
mother called 911 for help, the dispatcher refused to give life saving instructions over the
telephone. By the time paramedics amved, it was too late to save the child. Bill Billiter,
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promptly send an ambulance to the caller," or may fail to pro-
vide Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) with the correct
address from which the emergency call was made.16 Other m-
stances of human error may occur when the EMTs actually arrive
at the victim's location and incorrectly diagnose, treat, or transport
the victim.
17
B. Constitutional Analysis
Plaintiffs often use the statutory obligation of some govern-
mental entities to operate a 911 system18 to argue that the govern-
ment has a constitutional duty to rescue the individual in a negli-
gence-free manner. Proponents of this theory argue that failure to
properly rescue an individual in peril constitutes deprivation of life
or liberty, violating the Fourteenth Amendment.19 This argument
was specifically rejected in DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services.2" While this case did not involve a
Senate Approves Bill Giving Immunity to 911 Dispatchers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1992, at
A27. This particular case raised such furor that the California Legislature was persuaded
to amend the California code which now grants qualified immunity to dispatchers and al-
lows them to dispense medical advice over the telephone. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1799.107 (West 1992).
15. See, e.g., Hines v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 133, 135 (D.C. 1990) (dis-
patcher sent only a basic life-support ambulance to man's assistance when an advanced
life-support unit was needed; the first paramedics who arrived had to make two calls
themselves and wait 13 miniutes before an advanced unit was dispatched and arrived);
Barth v. Board of Educ., 490 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (school officials called
911 to aid an eleven-year-old boy who received a head injury on the playground; the dis-
patcher waited until receiving a third call before dispatching an ambulance, even though
the ambulance was parked directly across the street from the school. The boy was para-
lyzed because the 50 minute delay exacerbated a blood clot on his brain). See also Trezzi
v. City of Detroit, 328 N.W.2d 70, 71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 363 N.W.2d 641
(Mich. 1984) (911 dispatcher considered a call requesting police assistance a low priority
and waited 90 minutes before arranging for police vehicles to be dispatched; the plaintiff's
decedents died as a result of injuries received in an assault).
16. See, e.g., De Long v. County of Erie, 457 N.E.2d 717, 719 (N.Y. 1983) (dispatch-
er erroneously sent emergency assistance to the wrong address in response to a call from
a woman who heard her house being burglarized; by the time the correct address was de-
termined, the caller had been killed).
17. See, e.g., Gianeclum v. City of New Orleans, 410 So. 2d 292, 294-95 (La. Ct.
App. 1982) (paramedics allegedly worsened condition of a man they were transporting to
a hospital when they administered the wrong type of resuscitation treatment; the man suf-
fered brain damage due to lack of oxygen).
18. See, e.g., mnfra note 53 and accompanying text.
19. See e.g., Arclue v. City of Racine, 627 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Wis. 1986), aftid, 847
F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) (holding that
failure to dispatch an ambulance did not violate the Due Process Clause).
20. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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911 system, its holding is applicable to 911 systems. In DeShaney,
a child suffered considerable abuse at the hands of his father. The
Wisconsin Department of Social Services was well aware of the
boy's plight and had documented in considerable detail the boy's
numerous visits to hospital emergency rooms and his injuries. 2'
Despite this knowledge, the state took no action to protect the
child. Ultimately, the father injured the boy so seriously that he
was rendered permanently retarded.2 The boy's representatives
sued the state under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the state
deprived the boy of his "liberty interest in bodily integrity, in
violation of his rights under the substantive component of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."24 The Court reject-
ed this argument, finding that the Due Process Clause did not
require a state to protect its citizens from the actions of private
actors, but that the Due Process Clause "forbids the State itself to
deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without 'due process
of law."' Most significantly, DeShaney held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not impose a duty on the government to provide
aid or protective services.26 The plaintiffs in DeShaney argued
that, since the state was specifically aware of the boy's predica-
ment, a special relationship existed between the boy and. the state;
therefore, the boy's reliance on the state for protection created an
affirmative duty for the state to protect him.27 In unequivocal
21. Id. at 192-93. The Winnebago County Department of Social Services caseworker
"dutifully" recorded reports of the boy's visits to the hospital m her file, "along with her
continuing suspicions that someone in the DeShaney household was physically abusing"
the boy. Id. at 193.
22. Id. The boy suffered severe brain damage as a result of "traumatic injuries to the
head inflicted over a long period of time." Id. His brain damage is so severe that he is
permanently and "profoundly retarded" and confined to an institution. Id.
23. Tlus section is titled "Civil action for deprivation of rights," and states that any
person who "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured " 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1988). See generally ROBERT H. FREIUCH &
RICHARD G. CARLISLE, SECTION 1983 SWORD AND SHiELD (1983) (discussing and analyz-
ing the history of § 1983 claims in general).
24. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 189.
25. Id. at 195.
26. Id. at 196-97 ("If the Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide its
citizens with particular protective services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable
under the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide
them." (citation omitted)).
27. Id. at 197 (Plaintiffs argued that, since the state knew of the boy's predicament
and had "specifically proclaimed, by word and by deed, its intention to protect lurn
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terms, the Court rejected the "affirmative duty" argument." The
Court ruled that the Constitution does not impose a duty on gov-
ernment entities to protect an individual.29 Thus, by implication,
suits against 911 systems cannot be predicated on the Due Process
Clause, or brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; rather, a plaintiff must
maintain a suit based on the state tort laws in force.30
The dissent sharply criticized the seemingly harsh ramifications
of the majority decision in DeShaney. Justice Brennan stated
that the decision gave constitutional protection to state reaction and
seemed opposed to the effort to protect citizens.32 Of particular
relevance to 911 systems, Justice Brennan stated that "'the State's
knowledge of [an] individual's predicament [and] its expressions of
intent to help him' can amount to a 'limitation of his freedom to
act on his own behalf' or to obtain help from others. 33 The
DeShaney dissent puts considerable emphasis on the availability of
protective services, and the extent to which the individuals affected
in DeShaney had attempted to avail themselves of these services
for protection.' Under the circumstances, the state had induced
the plaintiffs to rely upon its services. If the plaintiffs felt that
their reliance was unfounded, perhaps they would have sought
other sources of protection.3 5 Similarly, citizens are under the im-
against that danger," an affirmative duty was created.).
28. Id. at 198. DeShaney was cited in Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127,
133 (D.C. 1990), to support a finding that no special duty was created between a 911
caller and the District of Columbia's 911 system. See also infra Part II.
29. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
30. See id. at 201-03. The Court stated that if special duties are created under state
tort law, states may be subject to suit since: "A State may, through its courts and legisla-
tures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes.
But not 'all common-law duties owed by government actors were constitutionalized
by the Fourteenth Amendment."' Id. at 202 (citing Danels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
335 (1986) (alteration in original)).
31. Id. at 203-13.
32. See td. at 204 (Brennan; J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 207 (quoting the majority's opinion, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200). Cf. Laura
S. Harper, Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal
Alternatives After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1393, 1414-25 (1990) (arguing that post-DeShaney recovery may be
available to women who argue liberty deprivation, property entitlements to police protec-
tion, denial of equal protection, and violation of state tort laws).
34. See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 208 ("Wisconsin has established a child-welfare system
specifically designed to help children like [the boy injured] In this way, Wisconsin
law invites-indeed, directs-citizens to depend on local departments of social servic-
es to protect children from abuse").
35. See d. at 208-09 ("The specific facts [of the case] before us bear out this view of
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pression that, when faced with a medical emergency, they can
ensure a prompt, effective, and professional response simply by
calling 911.36 While DeShaney states that an individual has no
reason to expect constitutionally guaranteed protection, the
plaintiffs' reliance is enough to establish a common-law duty,
thereby imposing a special duty on the 911 system to rescue the
individual. Once a special duty is created, anything improper, neg-
ligent, or tortious should create liability that cannot be circumvent-
ed by governmental immunity
C. Governmental Immunity as Applied to 911 Cases
The doctrine of sovereign immunity originates from English
common law, and was originally granted to the King.37 The ratio-
nale of the doctrine was that immunity of corporate entities was
necessary in order to avoid their financial demise.31 In feudal
times, the sovereign likely feared the adverse effect that uninhibited
tort liability applied against governmental or municipal entities
would have on the ability of the crown to collect taxes and other
feudal incidents and serviCes.
39
Beginning in 1812, the majority of courts m the United States
recognized the applicability of sovereign immunity to municipali-
ties.4° While governmental immunity is still widely recognized, it
Wisconsm's system of protecting children. Each time someone voiced a suspicion that [the
boy] was being abused, that information was relayed to the Department for investigation
and possible action.").
36. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
37. See ANTIEAU, supra note 4, at 7.
38. See Maas, supra note 5, at 105 (citing Note, Municipal Tort Immunity in Tirgita,
68 VA. L. REV. 639, 640 (1982) (discussing the historical rationale for applying sovereign
immunity)).
39. See, e.g., A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROP-
ERTY 189-94 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing feudal property arrangements and systems for tax
and rents collection).
40. The historical adoption of sovereign immunity has received some harsh criticism. In
Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 (N.D. 1988) (holding that an
action against a statute authorizing the state to make per-pupil foundation aid was barred
by sovereign immunity), Justice Meschke stated in a concurrence that: "Sovereign immun-
ty, a hallmark of totalitarianism, is contrary to our constitutions." Justice Meschke further
stated that, as "our forefathers fought a Revolution to repudiate an unresponsive sovereign,
it is antithetical to our heritage to immunize any government from accountability for its
actions." Id. (citing Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1982)). Jus-
tice Meschke concluded that: "Sovereign immunity is a judicial fiat of mysterious origin.
Id. at 911 n.4 (citing Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J 1, 4 (1924)
CHow [sovereign immunity] came to be applied in the United States of America, where
the prerogative is unknown, is one of the mysteries of legal evolution.")).
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has been significantly eroded.4' Expanding notions of tort liability,
combined with a greater liberalization of social policies,42 led
American courts to recognize that unmitigated governmental immu-
nity yielded unfair results for plaintiffs.43 Gradually, analysis of
whether to apply immunity focused on the extent and scope of the
activity that had caused the tort.44
The torts that resulted from governmental functions undertaken
for the benefit of the entire state remained protected by govern-
mental immunity because, without immunity, government could not
make the sort of policy decisions that "good government re-
quires." 45 The functions that were undertaken for the benefit of a
local entity or which benefitted a minority of the state's population
were not protected.'
Holding government officials liable for activities affecting the
entire state would force those officials to endure the burdens of
trial, which "would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,
or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
[official] duties., 47 Doubtless, courts were under the impression
that enough political constraints and the principles of federalism
would diminish irresponsible or negligent actions resulting from
acts of the sovereign government.
48
Government policy at a local level, or affecting individuals,
was regarded as having a greater potential for harm, because it was
not subject to the same constraints as official acts of sovereign
41. State tort acts serve to waive absolute government immunity and allow plaintiffs to
sue for torts. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996 (Claims and Actions Against Pub-
lic Entities and Public Employees) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (allowing tort suits against
government entities in specifically enumerated types of cases).
42. One area of tort law that has experienced significant expansion and liberalization is
recovery for emotional distress. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (al-
lowing recovery for mental distress resulting from directly observing a related third person
in peril or suffenng harm). But cf. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass.
1897) (denying plaintiff's recovery for emotional distress, since this would open the door
for unjust claims).
43. See Maas, supra note 5, at 105 (citing Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531,
539-40 (N.Y. 1842)).
44. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
45. ANTIEAU, supra note 4, at 9.
46. See Maas, supra note 5, at 105-06 (discussing the history of the discretionary
versus nuistenal analysis).
47. ANTIEAU, supra note 4, at 9 (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d
Cir. 1949)).
48. See ANTIEAU, supra note 4, at 10.
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entities.49 Thus, in recent years, states have relaxed absolute im-
munity for governmental entities as a defense for torts committed
at municipal levels; these changes have resulted in legislation that
"modif[ies] or qualiflies] immunity s0
Today, state legislatures have taken various steps to apply or
to limit governmental immunity Most states apply limited govern-
mental immunity,51 or hold that immunity is not available in situ-
ations where it has been specifically waived. 2
Many states have specifically addressed government liability
for emergency medical services. Some of these states have imposed
a statutory duty on municipalities to provide 911 services. 3 Some
states specifically state that 911 systems may enjoy governmental
immunity,' although the majority of states hold that immunity
does not automatically protect all facets of 911 system opera-
tions.55 Some jurisdictions impose a mandate on governmental en-
tities to purchase liability insurance coverage for their tortious
49. See id. at 15-16 (discussing executive or adnimstrative immunity).
50. See td. at 16-17.
51. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1033
(5th ed. 1984) (governments are mmune except where they have specifically consented to
suits).
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4791.1(A)(1) (West 1988) ("The provision of
consistently high quality emergency medical care, and any and all aspects attendant to
ambulance operation is essential to the health, safety, and welfare of the state and its
people.").
54. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:2K-38 (West 1987) ("No mobile intensive care
paramedic, first aid, ambulance or rescue squad members or officers, is [sic] liable
for any civil damages as the result of an act or the omission of an act committed
while rendering advanced life support services in good faith ").
55. See, e.g., CAL CIVIL CODE § 1714.2 (West 1985) (government immunity not grant-
ed "to any person whose conduct in rendering emergency care constitutes gross
negligence."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557b(A) (West 1991) (immunity from lia-
bility for emergency medical assistance "does not apply to acts or omissions constituting
gross, wilful or wanton negligence."); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4012 (1991) ("A gov-
enmental entity shall be exposed to liability for its negligent acts or omissions causing
property damage, bodily injury or death "); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1344(a) (1988)
("Any person who in good faith renders emergency medical care shall not be liable
in civil damages for any act or ormission, not constituting gross negligence "); IDA-
HO CODE § 5-331 (1990) (immunity extends to ambulance attendants "unless it can be
shown that the person administering first aid or emergency medical attention is guilty
of gross negligence "); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 5-106 (Smith-Hurd 1987)
("Except for willful or wanton conduct, neither a local public entity, nor a public employ-
ee is liable for an injury caused when responding to an emergency
call "); MICI. CONP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20965(1) (West 1992) ("Unless an [EMTs]
act or ormssion is the result of gross negligence or willful rmsconduct," EMTs are im-
mune from liability).
10751993]
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liability; 6 in these jurisdictions, the extent to which a municipal
entity may be held liable is limited to the extent of the insurance
coverage. 7
Many courts, in determining whether or not to impose liability
on 911 systems, focus on the duties assumed by the system. A
considerable amount of the courts' analyses focus on whether the
tortious act arose as a result of a discretionary or ministerial activi-
ty
Discretionary functions are those which involve high-level
planning decisions, such as the actual implementation of a 911
system and the various policy issues governing the system's imple-
mentation. 8 Ministerial functions are the decisions concerning the
actual operation of the system, and include the actions and deci-
sions made by the 911 dispatchers and EMTs in the fulfillment of
their duties.59 This note argues that the alleged errors in most cas-
es involve ministerial functions.6°
56. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-55-5 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) ("The governing
authority shall have further power and authority to obtain insurance against casual-
ty ").
57. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (im-
posing a statutory limitation of $100,000 on plaintiffs' recovery in tort suits against gov-
ernmental entities). It has been held that a government entity purchasing insurance cover-
age for $2 million does not waive the $100,000 limitation on liability recovery. Ayala v.
Boston Hous. Auth., 536 N.E.2d 1082, 1091 (Mass. 1989). Furthermore, it has been stated
that this recovery cap is designed to protect public funds from excessive liability and does
not deny equal protection of the law. Hallett v. Wrentham, 499 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Mass.
1986).
58. A discretionary function is an act "which requires exercise in judgment and choice
and involves what is just and proper under the circumstances." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
467 (6th ed. 1990). One court stated that discretionary acts are "characterized by a high
degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing alternatives and making choices
with respect to public policy and planning." Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292,
1298 (Mass. 1984) (discussing discretion involved in police officers' decision concerning
detention of drunk drivers).
59. See Douglas L. Bates, Note, 911: The Call That No One Answered, 10 NOVA LJ.
1319, 1325-26 (1986) ("[O]perational level decisions, such as dispatching [are] not
cloaked with immunity."). The test for determining if an act is discretionary or minstenal
has been stated as:
(1) Does the challenged act necessarily involve a basic governmental program?
(2) Is the act or decision essential to the accomplishment of that program as
opposed to one which would change the course of the program? (3) Does the
act or decision require the exercise of a basic policy evaluation, expertise or
judgment? (4) Does the governmental agency have the constitutional or statutory
authority to make this decision?
Id. at 1335 (quoting Evangelical United Bretheren Church v. State, 407 P.2d 440, 445
(Wash. 1965)).
60. See infra Part II.
IT'S TIME TO CALL 911
In deciding whether or not to apply immunity to ministerial
acts, many jurisdictions attempt to distinguish whether operating
and offering 911 services is a "public duty" or a "special duty "61
If a jurisdiction decides that the 911 system is for the benefit of
the general public as a whole, the courts generally allow immunity
as a defense.62 Other jurisdictions find that a "special relationship"
is created when an emergency call is placed, because only an indi-
vidual, the caller, is involved, rather than a large segment of the
population.6' Once a court decides that a special relationship has
been created, a "special duty" is incurred by the 911 system, and
the system must perform its functions in a prompt, efficient, and
non-negligent manner.' The jurisdictions disagree about exactly
what elements are needed to create a special relationship. One
court listed the requisite elements for the creation of a special
relationship as:
(1) Whether the victim was in legal custody at the
time of the incident, or had been in legal custody prior to
the incident (2) Whether the State has expressly
stated its desire to provide affirmative protection to a par-
ticular class or specific individuals (3) Whether the
State knew of the [victim's] plight 65
Other jurisdictions require that:
(1) the municipality must be uniquely aware of the particu-
lar danger or risk to which the plaintiff is exposed, (2)
there must be allegation of specific acts or omissions on
the part of the municipality, (3) the specific acts or omis-
sions must be either affirmative or wilful in nature, and (4)
the injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the direct
and immediate control of employees or agents of the mu-
mcipality 6
61. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
62. See mnfra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., mnfra note 115 and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194-95 n.11 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. dented, 470
U.S. 1052 (1985) (holding that state agencies may have a constitutional duty to protect
children subject to their investigation), quoted in Amy G. Markowitz, The Constitutional
Duty to Complete a Rescue: An Examination of Archie v. City of Racine, 23 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 487, 507 (1990).
66. Barth v. Board of Educ., 490 N.E.2d 77, 84-85 (ll. App. Ct. 1986) (citing Marvin
v. Chicago Transit Auth., 446 N.E.2d 1183, 1186-87 (IIl. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that
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Another factor discussed in some jurisdictions is the degree of reli-
ance that the 911 system induced.67 This factor may be stated as
a "but for" test. For example, "but for" the dispatcher's admonition
that an ambulance is on its way, the victim would have sought out
other forms of assistance.68
I1. CASES AND ANALYSIS
A. Cases Involving 911 Mishaps
Three cases concerning alleged misconduct of 911 paramedic
services were heard by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
on the same day- Wanzer v. District of Columbia,69 Hines v. Dis-
trict of Columbia," and Johnson v. District of Columbia.71 These
three cases contain fact patterns typical of most 911 cases.
The Wanzer case involved a victim who called 911 and com-
plained of a headache. Despite the victim's statement to the dis-
patcher that he had a terrible headache and had never experienced
headaches in his life, the dispatcher asked if the victim had taken
aspirin.72 When the victim replied that he had not, the dispatcher
asked "Then you need an ambulance and you haven't tried to take
an asprin?"7 3 Finally, the dispatcher asked "Don't you think that
you should take [aspirin,] wouldn't that be logical?" 74 No
ambulance was dispatched after the first call. Nine hours later, the
victim again called 911 and complained of the same symptoms.
After this second call, an ambulance was dispatched and the victim
was taken to the hospital, where he was diagnosed as having suf-
fered a stroke. Two days later, the victim died.75
police do not owe a duty to specific individuals, as their duty is to protect the public m
general)).
67. See, e.g., Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 140, 142 (D.C. 1990) (dis-
cussmg Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981) (en banc)) (finding that
the reliance of individuals on the District's 911 system does not create any duty on the
part of the system). See also supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
68. Cf Florence v. Goldberg, 375 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that the voluntary
assumption of school crossing-guard duties by the police department had induced reliance
on the part of plaintiffs. Thus, "but for" the service assumed, the plaintiffs would have
taken other precautions concerning their child's use of the crosswalk).
69. 580 A.2d 127 (D.C. 1990).
70. 590 A.2d 133 (D.C. 1990).
71. 580 A.2d 140 (D.C. 1990).
72. Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 128.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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In Hines, the victim lost consciousness, and a call was made to
911. Although an advanced life support unit could have been dis-
patched, only a basic life support ambulance was sent. 6 Upon
arrival, the EMTs realized that the advanced unit was needed, and
the EMTs themselves called for the advanced unit. Despite the al-
leged confirmation by the dispatcher to the EMT that the advanced
unit would be dispatched immediately, after ten minutes that unit
still had not arrived.' Ultimately, the advanced unit was not dis-
patched until after the EMTs made three phone calls to the 911
dispatcher. 8 The advanced unit transported the victim to the hos-
pital where she died two hours later.
In Johnson, the victim's friend telephoned the 911 number
when the victim complained of "feeling weak."79 After about fif-
teen minutes, the victim collapsed of a heart attack, at which point
a second call was made. When no ambulance came, a third call
was made, and an ambulance finally arrived, after over thirty min-
utes had elapsed from the time of the first call."0 When the
firefighters of the Emergency Ambulance Division ("EAD") arrived,
they had no advanced life support equipment other than an oxygen
mask and a mouth-to-mouth resuscitation device.81 Upon amval,
the firefighters "casually and slowly" walked into the house.82
When the firefighters went to examine the victim, "one firefighter
lifted the victim's eyelid with the rubber antenna of his radio rath-
er than touch [the victim]."83 The firefighters then asked to have
the victim moved to the living room, where they then waited for a
trauma unit to amve to take the victim to the hospital."4 When
the trauma unit brought the victim to the hospital, she died. At the
hospital, a doctor stated that the victim could have been saved if
"[they] had gotten to her a few minutes sooner."85
These three cases all challenged the District of Columbia 911
system's "adequacy and timeliness." 6 In each case, the Court of
76. Hines, 580 A.2d at 135.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Johnson, 580 A.2d at 141.
80. Id.
81. Id.
S2. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Hines, 580 A.2d at 137.
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Appeals held that the 911 system was not liable. The court applied
nearly all the sovereign immunity doctrines and their related argu-
ments. Interestingly, the court did not look to any statutory author-
ity in reaching its decisions, but instead relied solely on earlier
judicial precedents to make its determinations.17
The primary defense against imposing liability in these three
cases was that because no special relationship existed, the District
of Columbia owed no special duty to the victim. In Wanzer, for
example, the trial court dismissed the case because it was not
established "as a matter of law that the District owed a special
duty [to the victim.]" 88 The Court of Appeals, in affirming this
dismissal, relied upon a series of cases from other states that equat-
ed ambulance services with police and fire protection services. 9
87. One of the primary cases cited by the court in support of its decisions in Wanzer,
Hines, and Johnson is Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981), cited in
Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 129, 131-32; Hines, 580 A.2d at 136-37; Johnson, 580 A.2d at 142.
Warren involved women who telephoned 911 to report sounds of a burglary in their
apartment building, and were told by the dispatcher that help was on the way. However,
the dispatcher's relay to the police did not contain the message that a crime was in prog-
ress, so when the police arrived at the callers' residence and received no answer after
knocking on the door, they left; meanwhile, the women had seen the police car, and
thought it was safe to emerge from luding. When the women came out, they alerted the
intruders to their presence, and the intruders held the women captive for fourteen hours,
during which time they were repeatedly and violently raped. Hines, 580 A.2d at 137 (de-
scribing the facts of Warren). The court in Warren dismissed the case for failure to state
a claim, finding that no "special relationship out of which a duty to specific persons
ar[ose]" existed. Warren, 444 A.2d at 4; see also Hines, 580 A.2d at 137 (quoting War-
ren). A second case relied upon by the District of Columbia in deciding Wanzer, Hines,
and Johnson is Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983), cited in
Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 129, 131-33; Hines, 580 A.2d at 136-39; Johnson, 580 A.2d at 142-
43. In Morgan, a policeman's wife reported to the police department that her husband had
threatened her with a gun, but the department took no preventive or protective action.
Several months later, the husband shot the wife, their son, and another police officer.
Hines, 580 A.2d at 138 n.6 (describing the facts of Morgan). The Court of Appeals ruled
that no special relationship existed between plaintiff and the police. Morgan, 468 A.2d at
1319. In reaching its decision, the Morgan court applied the test for determining the
creation of a special duty, stating: "[A]n exception to the public duty doctrine arises from
the combination of (1) a specific undertaking by a government agent to provide help or
protection to a specific individual or group and (2) that individual's resulting particularized
and justifiable reliance." Hines, 580 A.2d at 138.
88. Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 129 (citing Morgan and Warren, among other previously
decided cases, for support).
89. Id. at 130 ("It is generally held that '[t]he institution of [a publicly operated]
emergency service is a service kindred to the police or fire service. This type of
service is incident to the police power of the state: i.e., to protect the health, safety, and
general welfare of its citizens." (alterations in original) (quoting Ayala v. City of Corpus
Christi, 507 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978)). See also Edwards v. City of
Portsmouth, 375 S.E.2d 747, 749 (Va. 1989) (In affirming a lower court's motion to
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Once the court equated these three services, it stated that the 911
system was implemented to summon efficiently and effectively any
one of these three services, and that all of the services were inter-
connected and vital to the health and safety of the community as a
whole.' The court's language seems to suggest a public duty
doctrine under which the government is immune from liability
because these services "safeguard the life and health of the citizen-
ry1,91
In Hines, the court specified that the public duty doctrine pre-
cluded liability, because "the mere fact that an individual has
emerged from the general public and become an object of the
special attention of public employees does not create a relationship
which imposes a special legal duty "92 Similarly, in Johnson, the
court found that no special relationship was created, despite the
911 dispatchers' assurances that help would be dispatched immedi-
ately 93 In reaching its decision, the Johnson court implicitly re-
adopted the requirements for establishing a special relationship,
which they first articulated in Morgan v. District of Columbia,'
requiring: "1) a specific undertaking to protect a particular individ-
ual, and 2) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff."95 The Johnson
court reasoned that, since the 911 system is created to protect
everyone, rather than any particular person, and since the service is
offered en masse, rather than to a specific group, the Morgan
requirements for a special relationship are not met, and thus, no
dismiss the case against 911 services on the grounds that the city was protected by the
sovereign immunity doctrine, the court stated that "the City could not have established the
emergency ambulance services here in dispute were it not exercising its police powers.").
The court in Edwards also drew an analogy to Asbury v. Norfolk, 147 S.E. 223 (Va.
1929), in which garbage collection was found to be a governmental function because it
concerned public health. Edwards, 375 S.E.2d at 749-50. The court reasoned that "if
collecting garbage is a governmental function, then providing ambulance services must be,
because it is difficult to imagine anything more directly tied to the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens." Id. But see St. George v. City of Deerfield Beach, 568 So. 2d
931, 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that "the function of mumicipal paramedics
falls [under] provision of professional, educational and general services for the health
and welfare of citizens, comparable to those performed also by private persons - and is
therefore not protected by sovereign immunity.").
90. Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 130.
91. Id.
92. Hines, 580 A.2d at 136.
93. Johnson, 580 A.2d at 140 (citing Hines, 580 A.2d at 136-37).
94. 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983) (en banc).
95. Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1314; see also Johnson, 580 A.2d at 142-43 (quoting Mor-
gan and stating that "in order for a special relationship to arise [between emergency per-
sonnel and a plaintiff] there must be 'justifiable reliance by the plaintiff.'").
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special relationship arises.
Other arguments presented by the plaintiffs in these three cases
concerned the fees charged by the system and the failure to follow
agency protocols. The plaintiffs raised the fee issue in Wanzer,
in trying to circumvent the District of Columbia's argument that
because ambulance service was analogous to police and fire ser-
vice, the public duty doctrine should be invoked to shield such
services from special duty claims. The plaintiffs countered that the
ambulance service was distinguishable from the other protective
services in that, unlike the other services, it charged a fee. 7 In
rejecting this argument, the court engaged in a lengthy analysis of
the fiscal policies of the District of Columbia's emergency services.
The court found that when the emergency services were imple-
mented, the thirty-five dollar fee was expected to "generate only
enough revenue to cover about twenty-five percent of the total cost
of maintaining the [Emergency Medical Service while]; the remain-
mg seventy-five percent of the cost was to be subsidized from the
general fund."98 In addition, the court noted that failure to pay the
user fee does not result in denial of services. Based upon these
distinctions, the court held that "operation of the EMS is an exer-
cise of the District[ of Columbia]'s police power, to further the
general health and welfare, user fees notwithstanding." 9
The plaintiffs m Wanzer also raised a protocol argument, alleg-
ing that the dispatchers had "depart[ed] from accepted EMS proto-
cols and procedures"' ° by not sending an ambulance within a
specified period of time. The court quickly rejected this argument,
finding that "[a]gency protocols and procedures, like agency manu-
als, do not have the force or effect of a statute or an administrative
regulation."" 1 Thus, the court stated that such rules only serve as
guidelines for the operation of legislatively mandated services. 1°2
The court in these cases applied nearly every sovereign immu-
nity doctrine available to absolve the District of Columbia's 911
system from liability What is unique about these decisions is that
instead of relying upon any statutory authority granting sovereign
96. Wanzer v. Distnct of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127 (D.C. 1990).
97. Id. at 131.
98. Id.
99. id.
100. Id. at 129.
101. Id. at 133.
102. Id.
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immunity, the court based its decisions upon previous judicial
opinions that established a broad application of sovereign immunity
to virtually any mishap committed by the police, fire, or ambulance
services of the District of Columbia."°3 Undoubtedly, other juris-
dictions will look to this court for precedent in deciding similar
cases, so the ramifications of these three decisions is certain to be
widespread.
B. Analysis
In deciding 911 cases courts pay a great deal of attention to
whether the person or entity committing the allegedly wrongful act
is engaged in a governmental or discretionary function, as opposed
to a ministerial or proprietary function."° Many of the courts'
decisions focus on the actual nature of the specific act, rather than
the context in which the act was committed. Discretionary acts are
those acts "'characterized by a high degree of discretion and judg-
ment in weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to
public policy and planning.'""05 Courts define many acts which
require a decision to be made by a particular officer, paramedic, or
dispatcher as being "discretionary", since they are based upon that
individual's personal judgnent"1 6  This reasoning, however,
amounts to nothing more than a semantic manipulation of the
terms "discretionary" and "ministerial."
Historically, discretionary functions were those functions having
103. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
104. See infra note 106 and accompanying text; see also Maas, supra note 4, at 105
(discussing the history of the discretionary versus rmsterial analysis).
105. Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1298 (Mass. 1984) (quoting Whitney v.
Worchester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (Mass. 1977)).
106. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Sacramento, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1070, 1074, 1081
(1987) (stating that a 911 dispatcher's decision to return a call to a caller in distress and
berate her over the telephone while the caller's rapist stood by, was a "discretionary deci-
sion invoking the 'personal deliberation, decision, and judgment' of the dispatcher and as
such was cloaked with discretionary immunity " (citation omitted)); Abraham v.
Jackson, 473 N.W.2d 699, 701-02 (Mich. CL App. 1991) (stating that, in a medical mal-
practice suit against EMTs, a suit was barred since the EMTs were making medical as-
sessments which "involved significant medical judgment rather than minor decision mak-
ingE, and d]efendants therefore were engaged in discretionary activity and were entitled to
immunity "); Trezzi v. City of Detroit, 328 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(implying that 911 dispatcher's actions were discretionary because they involved umque
decisionmaking dilemmas, and holding that such actions should be imunue from liability);
R.C. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 759 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that decisions not to implement back-up equipment on the 911 phone system so that
voices could be amplified and addresses could be located quickly were "discretionary" and
entitled to immunity).
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a uniquely governmental function, or those functions that only the
government was in a unique position to offer."7 The ministerial
or proprietary functions were those functions required to implement
or carry out the governmental duties."5 Examples of activity still
uniquely governmental in nature are military and diplomatic activi-
ties, and to a lesser extent, police and fire protection services."°
However, even police services are now less purely governmental
than they were historically, given the large numbers of private
security and patrol services available; ambulance services are even
less purely governmental, as large numbers of private ambulance
and patient transport companies are in operation." °
The real focus in 911 cases should be on the nature of the
allegedly wrongful act. If a dispatcher fails to dispatch an ambu-
lance immediately, dispatches the wrong type of unit or equipment,
sends the unit to the wrong address, or if the paramedics fail to
care for the patient promptly, it stretches the notion of discretion-
ary function to say that their specific act is governmental and so
immune from liability Arguably, but for the governmental decision
to provide 911 services, callers would never be in situations where
they would rely on 911, and no government employee would be in
a position where their acts would affect the public."' Thus, it
seems that any act performed by personnel of a 911 system is
ministerial. While certain acts may require decisions which call for
the 911 personnel to utilize their professional judgment, the choice
107. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
108. See PC., 759 S.W.2d at 620 (defiing a mnumstenal duty as one "of a clerical
nature which a public officer is reqired to perform in obedience to the mandates of
legal authority without regard to ls own judgment of opinion").
109. See ANTIEU, supra note 4, at 42 (noting that some courts have held that executive
officials of the highest level will be entitled to absolute immunity because of the discre-
tionary nature of the decisions they make); see also CHARLES S. RHYME El AL., TORT
LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS 194 (1976) (stating that "courts are
more than willing to tip the balance between protection from liability for the police offi-
cer and protection for the mjured plaintiff in favor of the plaintiff" in police brutality
cases, suggesting the lesser extent to which police services are considered uniquely gov-
ernmental or discretionary).
110. See CHARLES P. NEMETH, PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE LAW 13 (1989) (noting the
steady growth of private security since World War I); Blair Kamm, Private Securiy's
Peace of Mind Comes at a Price, CHL. TRm., Aug. 4, 1991, at Cl (stating that Amer-
icans spend more than double on private security in 1990 than they did m 1980). See
also Stephen L. Myers, Volunteer Ambulance Corps Fill the Gaps, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1992, §1 at 27 (describing how many volunteer ambulance corporations are being formed
by private groups in order to supplement the regular, overburdened 911 systems).
111. Cf. supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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of options and decisions they may make are limited and usually
pre-determned, as governed by a myriad of statutes, regulations,
and guidelines.11
2
One possible explanation for court decisions that all actions of
911 systems are discretionary and governmental, and thus, shielded
from liability by sovereign immunity, may be the concept of sepa-
ration of powers. While this doctrine is not stated by the courts, it
is possible that the judiciary is reluctant to impose liability on sys-
tems that are essentially created by legislative bodies and operated
as entities of the executive branch. The decision to operate 911
systems demonstrates a governmental commitment to enhance and
ensure the public welfare and safety Operation of the systems
requires significant commitments of governmental resources in
terms of finances, equipment, and manpower." 3 While increased
availability of advanced life support ambulances and a correspond-
mg increase in the number of highly trained personnel could pre-
vent many 911 mishaps, such escalations would require more re-
sources than most governmental entities can afford to allocate.
Imposing liability would require the courts to criticize the legisla-
tures for ,failing to take the measures necessary to increase the
reliability of the 911 systems. Such actions would also require the
courts to make policy or decisions that are not within the realm of
proper judicial activity
The separation of powers argument, however, fails to justify
liability preclusion for all 911 systems. Once the system is imple-
mented, it must adhere to certain standards. Imposing liability
would force legislatures to confront the flaws in the 911 systems
and mandate adherence to certain acceptable standards. The legisla-
tures are uniquely capable of implementing changes and practices
that would minimize or mitigate the potential for 911 mishaps.
Once the government has made the decision to deploy a system, it
is obligated to operate the system in a non-negligent fashion.
Virtually every court applying sovereign immunity and holding
911 systems immune from liability reason that no "special rela-
tionship" has been created by the mere act of calling 911, and
112. See, e.g., supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
113. The Los Angeles 911 system cost $50 million when first implemented in 1984,
and was "obsolete and overloaded almost from the beginning." Jane Fritsch, Hanging Up
On an Outdated "911", L.A. TmiEs, Aug. 5, 1990, at A3. A new system for Los Angel-
es will cost in excess of $235 million. Id. In New York City, the 911 system reqired a
"facelift" costing $22 million to ensure its continued viability. Lorch, supra note 3, at 39.
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thus, the system is under no "special duty" to provide exemplary,
error-free service to the caller.114 Courts analogize ambulance ser-
vices to police and fire protection services, and state that since
these services are designed to protect the public in general, rather
than specific individuals, no higher standard of care is owed to
callers seeking 911 assistance.
However, proponents of holding 911 systems liable argue that a
call to a 911 system does create a special relationship. First, the
dispatcher answering the call for help is immediately put on notice
that an emergency situation exists. And, second, the dispatcher is
in a unique position to assist the caller. Some courts have used
these factors in finding that a call to 911 does in fact create a
special relationship."'
114. See Lmd.Tay v. City of Dayton, No. 11302, 1989 WL 109289, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 18, 1989), holding that:
[A] telephone conversation between a member of the general public and a
police department, wherein the caller requests help and the police operator says
he will send help, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a special
relationship This is because a mere telephone call for assistance does
not sufficiently remove the caller from the class of the general population.
Regardless of the police dispatcher's response, it does not represent a commit-
ment of particular police resources to that individual.
(emphasis added). See also Sullivan v. City of Sacramento, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1070, 1076
(1987), in which the court stated:
A person does not, by becoming a police officer [or "911" dispatcher], insulate
himself from any of the basic duties which everyone owes to other people, but
neither does he assume any greater obligation to others individually. The only
additional duty undertaken is the duty owed to the public at large."
(alteration and emphasis added) (citing Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 8
(D.C. 1981)); R.C. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 759 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) ("The general rule is that there exists no duty to protect a party against intentional
crinminal conduct of unknown third persons [except] where special relationships
or special circumstances exist.") (citations omitted)).
115. See DeLong v. County of Erie, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887, 892 (App. Div. 1982), where
the court stated that:
It is not the establishment of the emergency call system to serve [the area],
standing alone which creates the duty. It is the holding out of the 911 number
as the one to be called by someone in need of assistance, [decedent]'s placing
of the call in reliance on that holding out, and [decedent's] further reliance on
the response to her plea for immediate help: "Okay, right away." This is not a
mere failure to furnish police protection owed to the public generally but a
case where the municipality has assumed a duty to a particular person which it
must perform in a nonnegligent manner, [although without the] voluntary as-
sumption of that duty, none would have otherwise existed.
(last alternation in original) (citing Florence v. Goldberg, 375 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1978));
see also St. George v. City of Deerfield Beach, 568 So. 2d 931, 932-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (finding that a special relationship was created when a woman twice called
911 for her profusely bleeding- husband); Barth v. Board of Educ., 490 N.E.2d 77, 84 (Ill.
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The most important factor that courts often summarily dismiss
is that of reliance. The omnipresent appeal to the public to call
911 when they are in need of emergency medical assistance is
evident in many forms: virtually all emergency vehicles carry signs
advertising the 911 service, telephone directories direct callers to
dial 911 for emergency assistance,'1 6  children are taught m
schools to call 911,117 and many communities have signs posted
on streets that advise passers-by that they are entering a "911 com-
munity" For all practical purposes, most Americans automatically
think to call 911 when m a medical crisis; this behavior is difficult
to characterize as anything other than "reliance.""
8
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that liability is im-
posed when an individual's reliance on another's undertaking of
protective services increases the risks to the relying individual or
causes harm." 9 Applying the Restatement, callers to 911 are un-
App. CL 1986) (rejecting city's claim that 911 emergency system was a police protection
service and further stating that "sovereign immunity does not apply when the police have
assumed a special relationship to a person that elevates her status to sometling more than
a member of the public") (citation omitted)).
116. See, e.g., OHIO BELL, CLEVELAND YELLOW PAGES i (1991) ("For Fire, Police,
Sheriff, Emergency Medical Service, Ohio State Highway Patrol dial: 9-I-I In an
emergency you are encouraged to dial 9-1-1 so your call will be received by the proper
emergency service as quickly as possible.").
117. See Frances G. Taylor, Repetition Key to Teaching Kids About Crisis; Teaching
Kus How to Get Help, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 14, 1992, at D7 (describing how area
schools start teaching children as young as three or four years old how to dial 911 and
handle emergency situations); see also EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, EMERGENCY
MEDICAL SERVICES COLORING BOOK FOR CHILDREN (Owego Township, N.Y. pubs. 1985)
(coloring book for children, extolling the virtues of EMS services and admonishing chil-
dren to call for assistance when facing a crisis).
118. People know that 911 works so well in fact, that they call it instead of calling
regular police telephone numbers when faced with a non-emergency situation, because they
know help will amve faster. Jack Sullivan, Police Seek to Cut Nonessential Calls to 911
Phone Line, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 1991, at 13 ("callers call [911] and say an emer-
gency exists to get police to respond quckly'). People have come to rely on 911 so
much since its debut 24 years ago that it has "become a nearly umversal signal of dis-
tress." Foster, supra note 2, at A10. People rely on 911 so much, that they will call it
for almost anything. See, e.g., Cramer supra note 14, at B3 (man called 911 because he
had swallowed a mouse on a $20 bet and wanted to know what he should do); Foster,
supra note 2, at A10 (people called 911 to get the weather forecast, report broken toilets,
and find but their senator's name; a six-year-old boy called to say his brother had stolen
his toy, and dozens of midwesterners call to report sighting the northern lights); Fritsch,
supra note 113, at A3 (caller called 911 to find out how to get a hunting license); Lorch
supra note 3, at 39 (man called to voice his suspicions that his rn-laws wanted to poison
him); Christine Winter, This 911 Not Just For Emergencies, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 1992, at
N.W. 1 (people call 911 to complain about barking dogs).
119. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) states that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
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der the impression that 911 is their best hope for rescue, and any
deviation from these expected high standards will result in harm. It
is entirely foreseeable that, if the system fails to dispatch timely
and adequate paramedic services, further injury or even death will
result.
Further, government employees should not be immune from the
same standards of duty and care applied to private mdividuals."'
The fortuity of the 911 employee being employed by the state
rather than by a private ambulance company should not bar recov-
ery, especially in light of our ever-expanding notions of tort liabili-
ty 121 In short, the establishment of 911 services creates an atmo-
sphere of reliance, which is understandable and justifiable, and
should be protected.
Advocates of sovereign immunity argue that special relation-
ships can only be created between the government and special
classes of people. In the 911 context, no special class is possible
because potentially anyone can call 911.'22 This argument seems
to focus on when the relationship was created, rather than on the
relationship itself. While everyone within the municipality may
have access, the system is designed to aid only those in need of
immediate assistance. Although identification of members of this
class before they call is virtually impossible, one can define the
class itself as those persons calling 911. While this may appear to
be an ex post facto determination, it is not an outrageous concept.
The 911 system was created to address narrowly defined and iden-
tifiable exigencies, which created a certain class of potential users.
The services offered by the city operate within pre-determined
geographic parameters and provide medical attention and life-sup-
porting transportation to a hospital. Relatively simple statistical
studies will reveal the frequency and type of calls, so the system is
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the under-
taklng.
(emphasis added).
120. See Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 131 (D.C. 1990) (addressing
plaintiff's argument that, since the District's ambulance service charges fees, they should
be "subject to the same tort liability as privately owned ambulance companues").
121. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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better prepared to handle the needs of the class it has set out to
protect. Thus, that specific, individual members cannot be identified
prior to calling 911 does not necessarily mean that a particular
class of persons cannot be identified.
A 911 system induces reliance and creates the perception that
calling 911 is significantly safer and more preferable than seeking
other, potentially unknown sources of assistance."n Courts should
find relationships between the government and callers because this
reliance, combined with the government's awareness of the caller's
predicament and its ability to assist the caller, are sufficient to
impose a special duty on the 911 systems.
Courts have given little attention to the protocols or procedures
governing 911 systems, instead focusing on the other sovereign
immunity issues. Protocols and procedures are the comprehensive
guidelines that 911 systems follow in their day-to-day operations.
When a call is placed to 911, dispatchers ask a series of questions,
all designed to assess and evaluate the type and degree of emer-
gency Based on the answers or information received, dispatchers
can determine which type of response the situation most warrants.
In the District of Columbia, calls are ranked on a scale of one
through four, in order of emergency status. 24 In Wanzer v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, after the victim complained of headaches, with
no history of such symptoms, the dispatcher ranked the call as
"'priority 4'[, which] is the lowest priority "125 The more dire the
circumstances, the higher the priority ranking the call receives. This
ranking allows the dispatchers to allocate system resources more
efficiently
Courts have ignored the importance of protocols and proce-
dures, and dismiss them for not having the authoritative value of
statutes or administrative regulations. 1 6 Courts could use proto-
cols and procedural guidelines as establishing standards of care to
defeat sovereign immunity If a 911 system has violated or mis-
applied its own internal operating guidelines, a plaintiff can present
a stronger case for imposing liability on a 911 system.
The most important purpose protocols and procedures may
serve in imposing liability is in demonstrating that use of such
123. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
124. See Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 129 n.1 (D.C. 1990).
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., iii at 133 ("Agency protocols and procedures do not have the force
or effect of a statute or an admnistrative regulation.").
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guidelines makes the acts of 911 system personnel purely minis-
tenal in nature and not discretionary Courts often categorize de-
cisions made by the government employees as discretionary, yet if
personnel make their decisions based on certain finite options, then
their decisions are actually ministerial. 7 Ministerial decisions are
not subject to sovereign immunity and, therefore, those persons
making decisions based on comprehensive protocols and guidelines
should not be totally immune from liability
Courts have also paid little attention to the issue of fees
charged by 911 systems in determining whether sovereign immu-
nity applies. Plaintiffs in 911 cases usually raise the fee issue in
order to distinguish ambulance services from police and fire protec-
tion services."' The fees charged vary in amount, from thirty-
five dollars129 to upwards of several hundred dollars. 3"
In these fee-for-service arrangements, the 911 system has argu-
ably entered into a quasi-contractual relationship with the caller. In
addition, when callers dial 911 knowing that the 911 system may
charge a fee for the services, they may have an even greater sense
of reliance on the system. This heightened reliance should lead to a
finding of a special duty, and thus should prevent application of
sovereign immunity
While the calculation of damages in breach of contract cases is
127. Cf Richard v. Department of Health, 572 So. 2d 692, 694 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(dispatcher disciplined for not following allegedly established protocols in her handling of
calls); DeLong v. County of Erie, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887, 890-91 (App. Div. 1982) (discussing
the problems with dispatcher's handling of 911 call and noting that he followed proce-
dure, suggesting a ministenal, rather than discretionary, mistake).
128. Most arguments raised by plaintiffs concerning fees fail to convince courts that
government immunity should be pierced. See, e.g., Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 131 ("[W]e hold
that operation of the [Emergency Medical Services] is an exercise of the District's police
power to further the general health and welfare, user fees notwithstanding.") (emphasis
added); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 140, 141 (D.C. 1990) ("The public
duty doctrine applies to conduct of the District's Emergency Ambulance Division in the
same way that it applies to conduct of the police and fire departments, notwithstanding
the fact that the District may charge a user fee for ambulance servce" (emphasis added)
(citing Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 129-31)); Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 375 S.E.2d 747,
750 (Va. 1989) (finding that the "governmental aspect of the undertaking is controlling"
with regard to ambulance service, and thus liability does not extend even though a fee
may be charged).
129. See Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 131 (noting the $35 fee for emergency ambulance service
instituted in 1976 to partially defray the costs of runing the system).
130. Telephone Interview with Billing Agent, Ambulance Billing Unit, Los Angeles Fire
Department (January 7, 1992) (an average bill for responding to a non-urgent care emer-
gency, such as an automobile accident, where first-aid and transport to a hospital are the
main services performed, is $250).
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markedly different from those m tort cases, creating a contractual
relationship may open 911 systems to the sort of liability allowed
in medical malpractice cases where the doctor-patient relationship
originates m the formation of a contractual relationship. Similar to
a patient who seeks out the services of a doctor, a caller to 911
expects that the system will fulfill its mission in a non-negligent
manner. Those running the 911 system can foresee that some act
or omission, misfeasance or malfeasance will result in harm to the
caller or victim.
An examination of analogous situations in cases involving
police detention of drunk drivers"' and hospital admission stan-
dards will further illustrate how courts have dealt with the discre-
tionary versus mimsterial function and the public duty versus spe-
cial duty doctrine.
In recognition of the fact that over twenty-two thousand drivers
are killed every year in traffic fatalities involving drunk driv-
ers, 32 federal and state governments have taken drastic steps to
limit this behavior.' In cases where officers stop, but fail to ar-
rest, a drunk driver and an accident results, many jurisdictions have
imposed liability on the governmental entity, the police department,
and the officers." 4 Those jurisdictions finding that the officers'
knowledge of the driver's state of intoxication creates a special
duty have generally rejected extension of governmental immunity
in these cases.' Often, the decision to circumvent governmental
immunity turns on whether the police officer's actions of stopping,
then allowing the drunk driver to drive away, are discretionary or
131. See generally Kelly M. Tullier, Note, Governmental Liability for Negligent Failure
to Detain Drunk Drivers, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 873 (1992).
132. Id. at 873 n.1 (citing NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANS., DRUNK DRIVING FACTS 1 (July 1991)).
133. See id. at 873 ("In response to the seriousness of the drunk driving problem, many
groups, including the insurance industry, citizen groups such as Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD), and both federal and state governments, have taken severe measures to
limit the extent of drunk driving and its inevitable consequences." (citations omitted)).
134. See id. at 874-75 n.17 (citing Ransom v. City of Garden City, 743 P.2d 70 (Idaho
1987); Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 720 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1986); Irwin v. Town of
Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984); Weldy V. Town of Kingston, 514 A.2d 1257 (N.H.
1986); Bailey v. Town of Forks, 737 P.2d 1257 (Wash. 1987) (en banc), modified 753
P.2d 523 (Wash. 1988) (holding police liable for failure to detain a drunk driver who
subsequently caused an automobile accident)).
135. See Tullier, supra note 131 at 891-92 (discussing Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-04,
which held that, since it is foreseeable that a drunk driver may injure someone, and since
the legislature has expressed an intent to remove drunk drivers from the road, there is a
special relationslup created between the police and the injured third party).
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minsterial.'36 Characterization as discretionary artificially extends
the traditional protection of sovereign immunity for discretionary
acts to those actions carried out in the field by government em-
ployees. 7 As a result, a number of jurisdictions have found that
police officers have a special, mandatory duty to detain drunk
drivers. 3 ' Those jurisdictions finding that immunity is not an ap-
propriate defense explain that government liability for the negligent
actions of its officers serves the purposes of adequately compensat-
ing victims of tortious acts and deterring similar future tortious
conduct. "9
The issue of unlimited access to hospital emergency rooms has
also undergone a significant transformation in recent times.14°
Under the common law, emergency rooms were usually free to
deny access to an individual. 141 The common law view was most
likely premised on the established tort law principle that a person
is not obligated to rescue a person in peril. 142 This harsh policy
has been partially rejected.by the liberal expansions of modern tort
law 143 In almost every jurisdiction, "courts have [held] hos-
136. See td. at 880 n.41 (stating that every state uses the discretionary versus numstenal
distinction, and grants immunity to government officials for their policy or discretionary
actions) (citing REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(B) (1965)).
137. Scholars have been critical of the attempts at distinguishing between discretionary
and nmunisterial function, arguing that the terms are too vague and flexible. See Lous L.
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209,
218 (1963) ("The dichotomy between 'nmstenal" and 'discretionary' it [sic] at the least
unclear, and one may suspect that it is a way of stating rather than arriving at the result.
One may also believe that it has become a convement device for extending the area of
nonliability without making the reasons explicit."), quoted in Tullier, supra note 131, at
882 n.54.
138. See, e.g., supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
139. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 51, at 25 ("T'he courts are concerned not only
with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When the deci-
sions of the court become known, and defendants realize they may be held liable, there is
of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of harm"), quoted in Tullier, supra
note 131, at 876 n.26.
140. See Kenneth R. Wing & John R. Campbell, The Emergency Room Admission: How
Far Does the "Open Door" Go?, 63 U. DET. L. REv. 119, 142 (1985) (noting that the
traditional common law rule giving hospitals an absolute right to choose their patients has
been abandoned by many modern courts).
141. See id. at 125 n.42 ("We begin with the shocking proposition that present law in
most American junsdictions is said to permit a hospital to keep its doors closed to the
person seeking emergency medical aid") (citation omitted)).
142. See, e.g., Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1897) (stating in dic-
tum that a person has no general duty to protect another from harm).
143. Cf Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976) (holding that a special
relationship exists between companions on a social venture and finding that, when one
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pitals or emergency room physicians liable for negligently refusing
or providing emergency treatment."144  In a leading case,
Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove,45 a hospital was liable
for the death of an infant when the decedent was denied admission
to the emergency room; the court reasoned that liability was ap-
propriate "if the patient has relied upon a well-established custom
of the hospital to render aid "146 In another case, Stanturf v.
Sipes,147 a hospital was held liable for exacerbated injuries suf-
fered by a man to whom the hospital had denied access because of
his inability to pay The court reasoned that "members of the pub-
lic had reason to rely on the [hospital for treatment].' 148
Most cases that result in holding hospitals liable premise their
holding on the notion that, "once [a hospital] undertakes to render
medical aid, [it] is required to do so non-negligently ,149
Thus, as courts are beginning to extend liability to police for
failure to detain drunk drivers, and as hospitals are under an m-
creasing duty to admit injured patients, it seems reasonable for
courts to hold 911 emergency medical systems liable for their
negligent conduct.
III. PROPOSAL
Legislatures or courts should abrogate unmitigated immunity
and create only limited liability for municipalities maintaining all
systems. A scheme of total immunity ignores all tort law goals of
compensating victims for their loss or injury Too often, states
allow 911 systems to escape liability by considering them as part
of the general police power of the state. However, while general
police powers are designed to promote the general health and wel-
fare of the community, 911 emergency medical services are de-
pended upon for specific purposes: prompt medical attention and
compamon knows of the other's peril, an affirmative duty to assist that person anses),
rev'g 215 N.W.2d 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
144. Wing & Campbell, supra note 140, at 126 (citations omitted).
145. 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961), aff'g 169 A.2d 18 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961), cited in
GEORGE, supra note 7, at 20-22.
146. Manlove, 174 A.2d at 140, quoted in GEORGE, supra note 7, at 21.
147. 447 S.W.2d 558 (MIss. 1969), cited in DAVID G. WARREN, PROBLEMS IN Hos-
PITAL LAw 88-89 (1978).
148. Stanturf, 447 S.W.2d at 562, quoted in WARREN, supra note 147, at 89.
149. Fjerstad v. Knutson, 271 N.W.2d 8, 11-12 (S.D. 1978) (reversing jury verdict m
favor of defendant hospital on grounds that the hospital had violated its own standards for
treatment and remanding for a new trial), overruled by 380 N.W.2d 659 (S.D. 1986).
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transportation to a hospital. In contrast, police and fire services
offer a wide array of services. Many of the emergency situations
police and fire departments respond to involve third party actors,
unrelated to the caller, as in the case of crime or fire. This distinc-
tion is important, as many 911 cases have been decided on the
grounds that emergency medical services are so similar to police
and fire services that they deserve the same immunity 150
A person calls the 911 system only when they are too ill or
injured to assist themselves, or when they need immediate medical
attention; these callers are under the impression that 911 can assist
them immediately In cases where the system fails to assist them
properly, total immunity from liability simply by virtue of govern-
ment - as opposed to private - status should not allow the re-
sponsible parties to escape liability
Once absolute or total immunity is abrogated, certain elements
of sovereign immunity defenses must be minimized. Too often,
courts will find the acts of the system's personnel giving rise to
the lawsuit are "discretionary," when such a finding turns on the
semantics of definmg the government employee's actions. Certain
acts do require decisions based on the dispatcher's or EMT's judg-
ment or experience, but it is irresponsible to uniformly categorize
these as not involving any ministerial functions."' Dispatchers
should be held to a negligence standard, and EMTs should be held
to a true gross negligence standard.
Dispatchers are faced with considerably less decisionmaking
pressure than are the EMTs. Dispatchers answer the calls and es-
tablish a link with the caller, asking questions to determine the
caller's identity and the nature of the crisis. The response that the
dispatcher considers appropriate depends on the answers received.
In many cities, the options a dispatcher has to exercise are prede-
termined by protocols or procedural guidelines. 5 2 In jurisdictions
with established protocols, dispatchers' responses are virtually man-
datory In these situations, dispatchers should be held to a general
negligence standard for failing to properly apply the protocols.
150. See, e.g., Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 131 (D.C. 1990) (the
court concluded that "the District's public ambulance service is equivalent to its police
and fire protection, so that the special duty analysis set forth in such cases must be
applied to the case at bar as well."). But see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
152. See Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 129 n.1 ("The Fire Department has developed 'general
procedures' to aid dispatchers in prioritizing requests for ambulance service.").
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More difficult to assess are the jurisdictions where the dispatch-
ers work without protocols. Many times, dispatchers are not suffi-
ciently trained m medicine to be able to adequately assess the
crisis faced by the caller. This situation places dispatchers m a
dilemma. Their personal judgment may urge them to dispatch an
ambulance, yet they are aware that many 911 calls do not warrant
a full emergency ambulance response. Their reluctance may be
heightened by the fear that a real medical emergency may present
itself and find the mumcipality with no available ambulance; thus,
ambulances cannot be dispatched to every caller complaining of a
headache, which often leads to tragic consequences. 53 Some dis-
patcher union representatives, recognizing that the dispatchers and
their government employers may be exposed to a greater number
of lawsuits m such situations where no protocols exist, have begun
lobbying for definitive protocol guidelines' 54 so that the public
can be served more efficiently 55 and they can be shielded from
liability
This note urges that all governmental entities providing 911
services enact such protocols as quickly as possible. The abrogation
of total sovereign immunity, combined with the adoption of defini-
five protocols, will arguably make 911 systems less vulnerable to
lawsuits, since jurisdictions will be able to ensure that dispatchers
follow an ordered set of procedures. If dispatchers are given a set
of well-constructed guidelines, which take into account virtually
every medical emergency the system could be faced with, and the
appropriate response is predetermined, then dispatchers and munic-
ipalities will be better able to assist or advise callers, and the en-
tire operation may be streamlined so that a greater number of
mishaps can be eliminated. Additionally, dispatchers will be more
effective if their decisions are not clouded by liability concerns.
The development of guidelines will eliminate many of the judg-
ment decisions dispatchers have to make, and if the protocols are
followed, the municipality will be shielded from liability, since the
153. See, e.g., id. at 129-31 (describing a situation where the victim died after com-
plaining of headaches, which were actually indications of fatal stroke).
154. California has enacted CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1799.107 (West 1992),
which grants qualified immunity to dispatchers dispensing medical advice and information
over the telephones.
155. Los Angeles has enacted protocols to help screen out non-emergency calls, and is
now telling callers with non life-threatennig problems to call their doctor or the local
hospital. Laurie Becklund, New 911 Rules Screen Minor Ills, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1992,
at B3.
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development of the protocols will be unquestionably discretionary
or governmental in nature, and thus, still shielded from liability
under the discretionary/ministerial analysis.
Further, immunity statutes should not be used to shield EMTs
completely from liability The actual administering of medical care
to callers in which EMTs engage requires a greater degree of inde-
pendent decisionmaking than the dispatchers' tasks, although their
decisions are to a large extent determined by the exigency of the
medical emergency they confront. Given this, the EMTs should be
held to a gross negligence standard of care. Courts often incor-
rectly equate gross negligence with wilful or wanton behavior,'-"
thereby immunizing conduct that should be sanctioned. Yet, willful
or wanton behavior is even more egregious than gross negli-
gence. 157 In many cases, courts hold that the actions of the EMTs
will be considered tortious only when their conduct is wilful or
wanton, which in application practically requires the EMT to di-
rectly and intentionally harm the victim.58 If EMTs are held lia-
ble for conduct which is outrageous, or is otherwise grossly negli-
gent, lawsuits will turn on factual issues which the jury system is
well equipped to handle. It is important to note here that many of
the 911 cases are dismissed on the defendant municipalities' sum-
mary judgment motions, or for failure to state a claim on grounds
of general sovereign immunity; the actual factual matters of the
negligent conduct of the system personnel rarely get through a full
trial.159 EMTs will be able to defend their actions in liability
156. See, e.g., Tatum v. Gigliotti, 565 A.2d 354, 358 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)
(equating gross negligence with wilful or wanton conduct (citing Four v. Juvenile Serv.,
552 A.2d 947, 956 (1989), af'd, 583 A.2d 1062 (Md. 1991)).
157. Gross negligence is defined as watchfulness and circumspection that -falls short of
being such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a wilful and
intentional wrong." BLACK's, supra note 58, at 1033.
158. See, e.g., Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 140, 141-42 (D.C. 1990)
(court stated that an EMT who examined the victim by raising her eyelids with the rub-
ber antenna of is radio rather than touch her was not liable since his actions, while
perhaps failing to conform to applicable standards of care, did not constitute an affirma-
tive act that actually worsened the victim's condition); Gianechim v. City of New Orleans,
410 So. 2d 292, 300 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (EMT not held liable, since improper CPR ad-
ministered to the victim was not proven to be the actual -cause-m-fact of the victim's
brain damage"), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802 (1982).
159. See, e.g., Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 133 (D.C. 1990) (affirm-
ing trial court's dismissal of case for failure to state a cause of action); Hines v. District
of Columbia, 580 A.2d 133, 140 (D.C. 1990) (affirming trial court's summary judgment
in favor of defendant District, as general sovereign immunity doctrines shielded District
from liability).
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suits successfully if they administer proper aid and conform to
applicable standards of emergency medical care.
The doctrine of shielding municipalities by refusing to find that
a special relationship between the municipality and the 911 caller
has been created should be abandoned. It seems a legal fiction to
determine that there can be no binding relationship between a
municipality and a 911 caller simply because that person cannot be
pre-determined as a 911 user. The municipality is immediately
aware of the caller's identity and the crisis the caller faces. Further,
a 911 call meets several of the critical factors of the above-stat-
ed'" test for a special relationship: the municipality is aware of
the caller's identity and peril, the municipality is in a position to
assist the caller, and the caller is under the impression that the
municipality is the best, if not the only, means of providing help.
In situations where someone other than the victim is the caller, lia-
bility should not be denied just because some third party has
placed the call;"' rather, liability should be imputed through a
third party, so long as the caller is in the immediate vicinity or
zone of the person in distress.
Abolition of blanket sovereign immunity statutes and the exten-
sion of liability to 911 systems will result in redress and compen-
sation to victims for their injuries. Holding dispatchers to a general
negligence standard for such acts as failing to adhere to or follow
protocols would have allowed recovery in many 911 cases. 6 2
Holding EMTs to a true gross negligence standard would have al-
lowed recovery in cases where the EMT's acts are callous, indiffer-
ent, or demonstrate a lack of dedicated commitment to quickly
aiding a victim. 63 It is unlikely that jurisdictions will ever reduce
the negligence standard for EMTs to anything below gross negli-
160. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Runnions v. City of New York, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, June 10, 1991, at
32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (plaintiffs suing city for negligence in assisting them after assault
by gang in subway demed recovery because an identified woman, also attacked by the
gang, had made the call to 911; no special relationship existed between city and
plaintiffs).
162. See, e.g., Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 128-29 (dispatchers instructed caller, who eventually
died from two strokes, to take aspirin for a headache, rather than sending ambulance as
required by established procedures); Hines, 580 A.2d at 140 (finding city dispatcher
shielded from liability for negligent failure to send the proper EMT unit to the aid of a
victim who eventually died).
163. Cf. Johnson, 580 A.2d at 141 (firefighters -casually and slowly" approached the
victim, examned her with the antenna of their radio, and asked relatives to "move [the
victim] to the living room").
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gence, given the difficult decisions concerning medical care that
EMTs must make and the general mexactitudes of medical sci-
ence.
164
Several policy concerns must be taken into consideration in
applying any standards to 911 services. The primary concern raised
by extending or expanding liability to cover all facets of 911 emer-
gency medical services is that municipalities may be dissuaded
from offering the services, or that individuals may be deterred from
working for the systems, for fear of liability exposure. But adop-
tion of the proposed standards could minimize these concerns. If
dispatchers follow the protocols properly, then any inquiry about
liability would have to go to the- protocols themselves, and since
the establishment of the protocols would be governmental or dis-
cretionary, liability would not attach. Municipalities are encouraged
to purchase liability insurance to cover their 911 emergency medi-
cal services, and jurisdictions are encouraged to pass statutes lim-
iting the amount of recovery in these cases.1 5
The demand for 911 services in many cities exceeds the capa-
bilities of the systems to respond to all calls. In many cities, pri-
vate and volunteer ambulance services are available, and may be
utilized in several ways." If a 911 system is experiencing a
temporary shortage of ambulances, dispatchers should notify callers
that delays in dispatching ambulances or substantial time-lapses in
arrival may take place before a municipal ambulance arrives. Tis
puts callers on notice that they should seek alternative medical
care/transport options. Municipal 911 entities could try to integrate
the private ambulances into the network, perhaps even serving as a
clearing-house or call-forwarding service for putting 911 callers in
touch with these private companies. If municipalities feel that this
is too risky, their own liability could be mitigated by requiring
private participants to be insured, and the municipality could ensure
that their actions are limited to making referrals only, with no
164. See Gianeclum v. City of New Orleans, 410 So. 2d 292, 300 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(EMT's failure to adrunister a particular treatment or the negligent adrmistration of an-
other type of treatment not able to be proven as a cause contributing to death of victim),
appeal dismissed, 459 So. 2d 802 (La. 1982).
165. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. But cf John C. McMillan, Jr., Note,
Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32 VIL. L. REV. 505, 536 n.146
(1987) (recognizing that some constitutional limits against these recovery cap schemes
have been raised, since similar cases against pnvate enterprses will not be subject to
limits).
166. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 110, §1 at 27.
1098 [Vol. 43:1067
IT'S TIME TO CALL 911
guarantee or warrant as to the quality or speed of the private am-
bulance. Since private ambulance- services are regulated by the
state, and all EMTs are certified by the state, legislatures could
extend some of the limited immunity statutes covering 911 oper-
ations to include private organizations. Reasonable statutes, insur-
ance safeguards, and other precautions will ensure that municipali-
ties do not suffer great financial losses due to 911 mishaps.
The imposition of liability may also have a desired effect of
upgrading the quality of the system. Municipalities concerned with
mitigating liability may exercise greater care in the hiring, training,
certification, implementation, and continuous re-training of all 911
system personnel, and the guidelines and protocols established will
be well constructed by experienced experts in emergency medical
care.
IV CONCLUSION
The overall goal of 911 systems is to provide prompt and
efficient medical attention to persons in need. For the most part,
911 systems meet this goal. Unfortunately, human error can some-
times create or exacerbate tragic situations. In these cases, victims
should not be denied compensation simply because unlimited sover-
eign immunity doctrines shield municipalities from liability, nor
should general sovereign immunity be used to protect negligent
dispatchers or grossly negligent EMTs. Rational standards of care,
enforced by rigorous judicial and legislative scrutiny, and well
constructed guidelines for decisionmaking and operation of the
systems, will combine with the diligence that exposure to liability
creates, to ensure that 911 systems operate the way they are in-
tended - to save lives.
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